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Chapter 8 
Civil Liability Relief for Brownfields 
Redevelopers 
Stepan Woocf 
Introduction 
Owners and potential developers of brownfield sites in Canada have 
argued for years that civil liability1 is a major obstacle to brownfields 
redevelopment. In 2003 the National Round Table on Environment and 
Economy recommended that governments enact legislation providing for 
eventual termination of civil liability for parties who complete an approved 
cleanup of a brownfield site. 2 
Developments in 2006 suggest that things are starting to move on this 
issue. The New Brunswick Liability Working Group, established in 
September 2004 at the request of the Atlantic PIRI group to study and 
make recommendations on the issue of liability, finished its work in 2006 
and its report is likely to be released soon.3 In December 2005, the 
government of Ontario established a Brownfields Stakeholder Group to 
2 
3 
Dr. Wood is Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, and a member of the bar of 
New York. Thanks to Jessica Ng and Paul Martin for excellent research assistance and to 
Michael Gerrard, Arnold & Porter, New York; Alan Wasserman, Williams Acosta PLLC, 
Detroit, Michigan; Richard Fil, Robinson & Cole LLP, Hartford, Connecticut; David 
Gualtieri, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Phyllis E. Bross, Esq., 
Counsel, Parker McCay, Marlton, N~w..· Jersey; and Michael Sprague, Director, 
Remediation Branch, New Brunswick Department of Environment and Local Govern-
ment. For more detailed treatment of the issues see Stepan Wood, Brownfields Civil 
Liability Relief' A Survey of Statutory Developments in the United States, United Kingdom 
and Australia, report prepared for the Ontario Ministry ofM unicipal Affairs and Housing 
(October 23, 2006), available on request from brownfieldsontario@ontario.ca. Any errors 
remain my own responsibility. The views expressed herein are my personal opinions only. 
For purposes of this chapter, "civil liability" means liability to a party other than 
government, arising under common law as opposed to legislation. 
National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, Cleaning Up the Past, 
Building the Future: A National Brow1~field Redevelopment Strategy.for Canada (Ottawa: 
NRTEE, 2003) at pp. 25-30. 
Atlantic PIRI ("Partnership in RBCA Implementation"), www.atlanticrbca.com, is a 
multi-stakeholder group in which the four Atlantic provincial governments work with 
non-governmental experts to develop and implement a risk-based corrective action 
process to clean up contaminated sites in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward 
Island and Newfoundland and Labrador. The New Brunswick Liability Working Group 
has 14 members representing banks, industry, lawyers, insurance companies and 
government. No environmental NGO or other civil society organization is represented 
on the group. Release of the group's final report was delayed by the election of a new 
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provide a sounding board on brownfields law and policy.4 The group met 
twice in 2006. One meeting was devoted to developing a common 
understanding of the liability issue and exploring potential solutions. In 
October, Ontario's Minister of Municipal Affairs told the Canadian 
Brownfields 2006 conference in Toronto that "we're close to coming to a 
consensus" on liability issues. 5 
Civil liability, in short, is squarely on the radar screens of several 
provincial governments. Deliberations appear to have advanced to the stage 
that some sort of action can be expected soon, although it is too early to 
predict what kind. Participants in the debate often refer to developments in 
other jurisdictions - particularly the United States - to support their 
positions. Until now, however, information about how governments in 
other jurisdictions are dealing with the civil liability issue has been 
anecdotal, incomplete and often vague. The aim of this chapter is to begin 
to fill this gap by summarizing the extent to which governments in the 
United States offer relief against third party civil liability to stimulate 
brownfields redevelopment, and asking what lessons this might hold for 
Canada. 
Several kinds of parties face potential civil liability risk in relation to 
brownfields redevelopment. Alongside the original polluter(s), these 
include various relatively "innocent" parties who did not actually cause 
or contribute to the contamination, such as: 
4 
5 
• persons who owned or operated a site at the time it became 
contaminated but did not cause or contribute to the contamina-
tion; 
• persons who acquired property without knowledge of the 
contamination, despite having made reasonable inquiries at the 
time of acquisition ("innocent landowners"); 
• persons who acquired or plan to acquire property knowing it is 
contaminated but intending to clean it up and redevelop it 
("prospective purchasers" before acquisition and "bona fide 
purchasers" thereafter); 
• persons who acquired a property after it was cleaned up; 
• owners or operators of nearby property that became contaminated 
as a result of migration of contamination from a contaminated site 
("contiguous owners"); 
provincial government, but as of November 2006 the Working Group expected to present 
its report and implementation plan to the government imminently. 
The Brownfields Stakeholder Group is made up of approximately 25 organizations 
representing developers, industry, lenders, insurers, environmental consultants, lawyers, 
planners and municipal and federa l governments, along with two environmental NGOs. 
The Honourable John Gerretsen, Ontario Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 
speech to Canadian Brownfields 2006 conference, Toronto (October 26, 2006) (speaking 
notes availab le from MAH Web site, www.mah.gov.on.ca). 
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• secured lenders; and 
• municipalities that become owners of contaminated sites, often 
involuntarily. 
This chapter is restricted to one subset of these parties, namely 
"innocent" owners and operators who acquire a site that is already 
contaminated and who did not cause or contribute to the contamination. 
This includes, to use the prevailing American terminology, "innocent 
landowners", "bona fide purchasers", "prospective purchasers", "contig-
uous landowners", and "post-cleanup purchasers". These parties have 
received the most attention in Canadian debates about civil liability relief. 
This chapter does not address legislation regarding civil liability of 
polluters, lenders, fiduciaries , or municipalities. Nor does it address 
legislation restricted to specific contaminants, such as dry cleaning solvents 
or petroleum.6 
Civil Liability Relief for Innocent Owners and Operators in the 
United States 
The U.S. federal government and the majority of state governments 
have not seen fit to relieve any innocent owners or operators of 
contaminated land against civil liability to third parties.7 While federal 
legislation and regulations have been enacted or amended numerous times 
since the early 1990s to limit regulatory liability for parties such as secured 
lenders, innocent landowners, contiguous landowners, bona.fide purchasers 
and prospective purchasers, such relief does not extend to civil liability. 
For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Prospec-
tive Purchaser Agreements and Brownfields Covenants Not to Sue do not 
purport to limit injured third parties' rights to sue in tort.8 Nor does the 
federal Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 
2002, which protects small businds~s, innocent landowners and bonafide 
prospective purchasers against regulatory liability only.9 Similarly, many 
states have introduced voluntary cleanup programs under which purchasers 
or prospective purchasers who complete a voluntary cleanup to the 
satisfaction of state environmental regulators receive some form of liability 
relief in return. The majority of these programs do not purport to limit civil 
liability to parties other than the state, and some expressly preserve it. 10 The 
6 
7 
See Stepan Wood, Brown.fields Civil Liability Relief" A Survey of Statutory Developments in 
the United States, United Kingdom and Australia, report prepared for the Ontario Ministry 
of Municipal Affairs and Housing (October 23, 2006), available on request from 
browntieldsontario@ontario.ca, for a detailed discussion of these issues. 
The same appears to be true for the United Kingdom and Australia. Wood, ibid. 
Michael B. Gerrard, ed., Brown.fields Law and Practice (Newark, N.J .: Matthew Bender, 
1998), chapter 13, "EPA Prospective Purchaser Agreements and Comfort/Status Letters". 
9 P.L. 107-118, January 11, 2002, 115 Stat. 2356. 
10 E.g., N.Y. Environmental Conservation Law § 27-1421 ("Nothing in this section shall 
130 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE YEAR IN REVIEW 2006 
farthest most states and the federal government go is to relieve certain 
cleanup contractors and "Good Samaritans" who assist with hazardous 
spills against civil liability arising out of releases caused or exacerbated by 
their actions. 
Seven U.S. states -- Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mis-
souri, New Jersey and Virginia - have enacted legislation designed to 
immunize innocent owners and operators of brownfields against civil 
liability to some degree. A further four states - Alabama, California, 
Connecticut and Georgia --- have enacted legislation that is unclear but 
might be interpreted as limiting such liability. Most of these immunities are 
available only to a narrow class of eligible parties, in limited circumstances, 
subject to numerous conditions. Most appear to apply in situations where 
the risk of civil liability was small to begin with. These provisions are, on the 
whole, not widely known by brownfields lawyers, not widely relied on in 
practice and not perceived to be an important element of the brownfields 
legal regime in the U.S. A leading U .S. brownfields lawyer characterizes 
them as being "below the radar screens" of brownfields practitioners. 11 
Many of these legislative provisions are drafted in vague, ambiguous 
or convoluted terms that make it very difficult to ascertain whether, how, or 
to what extent they limit third party civil liability. Almost none of them have 
been tested in court, as a result of which it is difficult to predict how they 
might be interpreted. In the U.S., as in other common law jurisdictions, a 
statute will generally not be interpreted as limiting or removing common law 
rights of action unless it does so unequivocally or is so repugnant to the 
common law that the two cannot coexist, and this principle has been 
invoked to hold that a purported brownfields civil liability limitation did not 
bar a private lawsuit. 12 It is therefore safe to assume that limitations of civil 
liability will be construed narrowly in favour of affected third parties and 
must be clear and unequivocal to take effect. This is to say nothing of such 
provisions' constitutional validity. 13 For purposes of this chapter, the 
provisions characterized as "uncertain" are included along with those that 
clearly purport to limit civil liability, with an explanation why they were 
classified as uncertain. 
affect the liability of any person with respect to any civil action brought by a party other 
than the state"); Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act, Minn. Stat § 
J J SB. 12 ("nothing in (the statute] shall be construed to limit or restrict in any way the 
liability of any person under any other state or federal Jaw, including common Jaw, for loss 
due to personal injury or disease, for economic loss, or for response costs arising out of any 
release or threatened release"). 
11 Interview with Michael Gerrard, Arnold & Porter, New York (October 17, 2006). 
12 Courtney Enterprises, Inc. v. Publix Super J'vfarkets, Inc ., 788 So.2d 1045, rehearing denied, 
review denied 799 So.2d 218 (Fla. C.A., 2d Dist., 2001) (interpreting Florida's dry cleaning 
contamination liability relieflegislation, which is not discussed in this chapter; see Wood, 
op. cit., footnote 6, at pp. 17-18). 
13 See Bormann v. Board of Supervisors In and For Kossuth County, 584 N .W.2d 309 (Iowa, 
1998) (holding nuisance immunity provision in right-to-farm legislation unconstitutional). 
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Rather than reciting the details of all of these statutory provisions, the 
chapter focuses on those that appear the most noteworthy. For each of these 
"key" immunity provisions, the chapter describes who is eligible for 
immunity, the scope of immunity, the conditions for obtaining or 
maintaining it, the events that trigger it, and any "reopeners" of liability. 
There is remarkable variation on all of these points. Thereafter the chapter 
summarizes developments in other states, very briefly. 
Michigan 
Michigan has two legislative provisions, in force since 1995, that 
provide limited civil liability protection to innocent parties and, in some 
circumstances, polluters. First, parties who are explicitly exempted from 
statutory cleanup liability and who comply with a statutory obligation to 
prevent further exposure are immune against statutory or common law 
claims for performance of cleanup activities with respect to pre-existing 
contamination. 14 
• Eligibility: Anyone who is expressly exempted from statutory 
cleanup liability is eligible. This includes innocent landowners. It 
also includes bona fide or prospective purchasers who conduct a 
"baseline environmental assessment" (BEA) within 45 days of 
acquiring the property and disclose the results to the state and any 
subsequent transferee. No government determination of eligibility 
is required. Polluters who have complied with Michigan's cleanup 
legislation 15 are also eligible. 
• Scope: Because immunity may be available to polluters, it is 
confined to "a claim in law or equity for performance of response 
activities" 16 and explicitly excludes tort claims for consequential 
damages. 17 The purpose is.t-0 bar civil claims similar to statutory 
cleanup or cost recovery claims and prevent third parties from 
doing an end run around the statute. 
• Conditions: Eligible parties who know of contamination on their 
property must comply with a statutory duty to prevent exacerba-
tion of existing contamination, exercise "due care" to mitigate 
14 Michigan Environmental Response Act, Mich. Comp. L. § 324.20142(1). 
15 This requires, among other things, that the polluter determine the nature and extent of the 
release, report it, stop it at the source, immediately take any practical and cost-effective 
response actions, and "diligently pursue" cleanup to regulatory criteria. Environmental 
Response Act, § 20114. 
16 Environmental Response Act, § 20142(1). 
17 Immunity does not cover "tort claims unrelated to performance of response activities", 
"tort claims for damages which result from response activities" , or "tort claims related to 
the exercise or failure to exercise responsibilities under section 20107a". Environmental 
Response Act, § 20142(2). 
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hazards, and take precautions against foreseeable actions of third 
parties. 18 
Timing: Immunity attaches automatically upon meeting the 
eligibility requirements. 
Reopeners: Liability is reopened for new releases for which the 
party is responsible. 
Bona fide and prospective purchasers who are not satisfied with the 
immunity available automatically under the previous provision may apply 
to the state, within six months of completing a BEA, for a determination 
that they are exempt from statutory liability on the basis of having 
conducted a BEA, and that their f roposed use of the property will satisfy 
their statutory "section 7a" duty. I' Upon a positive determination, they are 
immune against liability for response activity costs, fines, penalties, natural 
resource damages or equitable relief under statute or common Jaw resulting 
from contamination identified in the petition or from undiscovered pre-
existing contamination. Because this second immunity is available only to 
parties who are innocent of the contamination, it is broader than the 
previous one, but its exact scope is ambiguous. It is not clear, for instance, 
whether it is subject to the same "tort" exclusions as the previous 
provision. 20 Liability is reopened for new releases for which the party is 
responsible, and for a violation of the "section 7a" duty that is inconsistent 
with the state's determination of eligibility. 
Michigan's civil liability relief was intended more or Jess to codify 
common Jaw. The person who caused the contamination would likely be 
liable in tort to third parties for consequential damages, and the legislation 
preserves this liability. Innocent parties who did not cause the contamina-
tion and exercised due care to prevent further exposure would not likely be 
liable to third parties at common Jaw except for contamination they cause 
themselves, and the legislation preserves this situation. The legislation only 
limits civil liability for parties who fulfill their "section 7a" obligation, which 
was intended to be equivalent to a common law duty of care (although this 
assumption has apparently not been tested in court). 
Despite the narrow scope of liability relief, concerns have arisen that 
some parties are abusing it. There is no way to verify whether parties 
claiming immunity comply with their statutory obligations, and there are 
concerns that some do not. There are no clear rules as to what statutory "due 
care" entails or how its fulfillment is to be ensured. Because of these 
concerns, the first immunity provision has had little or no impact on 
18 Environmental Response Act,§ 20 I 07a( I). 
19 Environmental Response Act, § 20129a(5). 
20 See, e.g. , Grant R. Trigger et al. , "Making Brownfields Green Again: How Efforts to Give 
Urban Centers an Economic Facelift Have Changed the Face of Environmental Policy" 
(1997), 76 Mich. Bar.!. 42. 
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brownfields redevelopment. The second is popular with lenders but has had 
limited impact, partly because state eligibility determinations tend to be full 
of caveats. The entire statutory cleanup scheme is currently under review, 
and efforts are underway to clarify the meaning of due care and tighten 
liability relief rules so that parties in fact observe their due care obligations. 
Massachusetts 
Massachusetts has three remarkably convoluted but narrow civil 
liability relief provisions, enacted in 1998. They are aimed, respectively, at 
innocent owners or operators who complete an approved voluntary 
cleanup, contiguous owners, and parties (including polluters) who do not 
qualify for immunity under either of the first two provisions.21 
First, innocent owners and operators of contaminated sites who did 
not own the property at the time of the release and who clean up the 
contamination to regulatory standards are immune against liability to the 
state or any third party for property damage under common law, for any 
release addressed by the cleanup.22 
• Eligibility: An owner or operator of a site at which there has been a 
release, who would be statutorily liable solely on the basis of its 
ownership or operation of the site, is eligible if the person did not 
cause or contribute to the release and did not own or operate the 
site at the time of the release. 
• Scope: Eligible persons are immune against liability to the state or 
third parties for property damage under the common law arising 
from any release that has been cleaned up, except for liability 
arising under a contract. 
• Conditions: The eligible person must complete a cleanup to 
regulatory standards as ce.Ftified by a licensed waste site cleanup 
professional. The cleanup must comply with state law and meet the 
statutory standard of care of a reasonable and diligent licensed 
waste site cleanup professional. The person must also comply with 
all reporting and public notice requirements, provide site access to 
state officials, respond to the state's information requests, and 
settle any cleanup costs incurred by the state for which the person is 
potentially liable under the state Superfund law. The latter 
condition gives the state "effective veto power over the applic-
ability of the exemption". 23 
21
·- M-as-sa-c-hu- s-et-ts-has also enacted liability relief for innocent tenants of contaminated sites, 
but this does not appear to cover common law liability. Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous 
Material Release Prevention and Response Act, Mass. Gen. L. c. 21E, § 2 "Owner" or 
"Operator", para. (e)(4). 
22 Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention and Response Act, § 
5C(a). 
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• Timing: Immunity attaches only upon completion of the cleanup. 
• Reopeners: Liability may be reopened for failure to achieve the 
applicable cleanup criteria, new releases, violation of an activity 
and use limitation imposed as part of the cleanup, new exposure to 
pre-existing releases caused by a violation of an activity and use 
restriction, and releases exacerbated by the eligible person. 
Liability may also be reopened if the cleanup does not comply 
with state cleanup laws. This is noteworthy because it is not subject 
to a materiality criterion: immunity may be lost for minor, 
technical breaches. 24 
Second, contiguous owners are protected against liability for property 
damage arising from a release that migrated onto the site via groundwater or 
surface water.25 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Eligibility: An owner or operator of a contaminated site, who 
would be statutorily liable solely on the basis of its ownership or 
operation of the site, is eligible if the person did not cause or 
contribute to the release, the contamination has migrated to the 
person's property from off-site, and the person does not and never 
did own or operate any portion of the source site. 
Scope: An eligible person is immune against liability to the state or 
a third party for property damage under the common law arising 
from any release that originated off-site, except for liability under a 
contract. 
Conditions: The person is not required to clean up the contamina-
tion, but must take reasonable steps to prevent exposure and 
imminent hazards, comply with all reporting and notice require-
ments, provide site access, not interfere with response actions, nor 
exacerbate the release. No government approval is required. 
Timing: Immunity attaches automatically upon meeting the 
eligibility requirements. 
Reopeners: Liability may be reopened for releases exacerbated by 
the eligible person . · 
Finally, Massachusetts reserves the right to cut special deals with 
current or prospective owners or operators who intend to clean up and 
redevelop a brownfield but do not qualify for the above immunities.26 The 
23 Seth D. Jaffe, "Massachusetts Brownfields Legislation: A Description and Analysis" 
(Nov./Dec. I 998), 42 Boston Bar.!. 6. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention and Response Act,§ SD. 
26 Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention and Response Act, § 
3A(j)(3)(c). 
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·state may enter a Brownfields Covenant Not to Sue (CNTS) Agreement 
under which such parties are immune against liability for property damage 
under the common law. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Eligibility: Current or prospective owners or operators who intend 
to redevelop a brownfield but do not qualify for the immunities 
described above, for example because they caused the contamina-
tion, owned or operated the site at the time of the release, or cannot 
feasibly complete a cleanup to the prescribed standard, may apply 
for a Brownfields CNTS Agreement with the state, entry into 
which is entirely in the state's discretion. 
Scope: The agreement immunizes the person against liability to the 
state, or to any other person who has received notice of an 
opportunity to join the agreement, for property damage under the 
common law, but only in relation to matters expressly addressed in 
the agreement. The applicant must serve a state-approved "notice 
of rights of affected third parties" on a wide range of specified 
parties and publish the notice in local newspapers for three weeks. 
Conditions: The proposed redevelopment must provide defined 
public benefits such as jobs, affordable housing or open space and 
the state must be convinced that the project would not go ahead 
without customized liability relief. The applicant must submit a 
development plan and application for a CNTS specifying the 
liability protection requested, why it is justified and why the 
existing statutory relief is inadequate. The applicant must clean up 
the site to regulatory standards, but if it can convince the state that 
this is not feasible and it qualifies as an "eligible person", it may 
clean up to a "temporary solution" only. The cleanup must comply 
with state law (again, not subject to a materiality criterion) and 
meet the statutory standai;cl of care of a reasonable and diligent 
licensed waste site cleanup professional. 
Timing: Immunity may attach before cleanup begins or only after 
completion, depending on whether the applicant is an "eligible 
person" and the type of cleanup. 
Reopeners: Liability may be reopened for fraud, violation of the 
CNTS Agreement by the applicant or a subsequent owner; new 
releases after the covenant vests, new exposure caused by the 
applicant, releases that violate use restrictions, and failure to meet 
"eligible person" criteria. Moreover, the state may step in at any 
time to take response actions itself. 
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New Jersey 
In New Jersey, since 1998, bona fide purchasers who complete a 
voluntary cleanup or can point to a previous "no further action" (NF A) 
letter issued by the state with respect to contamination at the site, and 
innocent landowners, are immune against civil liability for cleanup and 
removal costs and "any other damages" if they meet certain conditions.27 
• Eligibility: Immunity is available to a bona fide purchaser who 
completes an unsupervised cleanup to regulatory standards, 
conducts a state-supervised cleanup under an approved cleanup 
plan, or relies on a prior NF A letter issued by the state signifying 
that the site already meets regulatory standards. Immunity is also 
available to an innocent landowner without conducting a cleanup. 
Anyone claiming immunity must have disclosed the contamina-
tion to the state upon discovery and must not have been 
responsible in any way for the substance or the release or be 
related to anyone who was. 
• Scope: There are two immunity provisions with slightly different 
terms. The first relieves innocent owners and bonafide purchasers 
against liability for "cleanup and removal costs or for any other 
damages" for the contamination under statute or common law. 28 
This provision originally only limited the state's ability to sue 
innocent owners for "natural resources damages" under either 
statute or common law. It was extended to third party civil liability 
in 1998, in conjunction with enactment of a second provision 
aimed explicitly at third party liability.29 This second provision 
relieves bona fide purchasers against liability to anyone other than 
the government for "cleanup and removal costs or damages" 
under statute or common law. These provisions apply to on-site 
contamination from pre-existing releases and - for bona fide 
purchasers - off-site migration of pre-existing releases. The scope 
of liability relief is, however, unclear under both provisions. 
"Damages" are not defined. Whether these provisions extend 
beyond cleanup cost recovery or "natural resources damages"-
style claims to include tort claims for consequential damages 
remains uncertain and has not been tested in court. 
• Conditions: Bona fide purchasers must complete a cleanup to 
regulatory standards, or rely on a previously issued NF A letter. 
Innocent landowners need not perform a cleanup. 
27 New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N..l . Stat§ 58:20-23.11 g(d)(2), (5), and 
(f), 
28 New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act,§ I lg(d)(2), (5). 
29 New .Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, § l lg(f). 
• 
• 
Iowa 
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Timing: For bona fide purchasers, immunity attaches upon 
successful completion of an unsupervised cleanup, upon com-
mencement of cleanup under a state-approved cleanup plan, or 
automatically in reliance on an NF A letter issued for a prior 
cleanup. For innocent landowners, immunity attaches automati-
cally upon meeting the eligibility requirements. 
Reopeners: Liability may be reopened for new releases, exacerba-
tion of existing releases or of their impacts, failure to maintain 
institutional or engineering controls or otherwise comply with the 
cleanup plan or NF A letter, or violation of laws and regulations 
(like Massachusetts, this is not subject to a materiality criterion), 
and the state may step in at any time to conduct response actions 
itself. 
In Iowa anyone who acquires a contaminated property is immune 
against all third-party liability, provided that they did not cause the 
contamination, and do not "knowingly" allow a new release.30 This broad 
immunity is remarkable given that neither a cleanup nor formal government 
approval is required. 
• 
• 
Eligibility: Immunity is available to any person who acquires a 
contaminated property, is not a "potentially responsible party" 
(that is, did not cause the contamination or resulting damage) or 
related to one, and does not knowingly cause or permit a new 
release that injures a third party or contaminates a third party's 
property. 
Scope: An eligible party is immune against liability to any third 
party for "any liability ""~r obligation, other than contractual 
obligations that specifically waive all or part of the immunity 
provided by [this section], arising out of or resulting from 
contamination of property by a hazardous substance ... including 
without limitation, claims for illness, personal injury, death, 
consequential damages, exemplary damages, lost profits, trespass, 
loss of use of property, loss of rental value, reduction in property 
value, property damages, or statutory or common law nui-
sance". 31 The only exceptions are criminal liability and statutory 
cleanup liability to the state. The immunity covers pre-existing on-
site releases, off-site migration unless exacerbated by the party 
claiming immunity, and new releases unless knowingly caused. 
30 Iowa Code,§ 455B.752. 
31 Iowa Code,§ 455B.75l. 
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• Conditions: No cleanup and no government approval is required. 
If experience in other states such as Michigan is any indication, this 
· is likely to lead to concerns about abuse. 
• Timing: Immunity attaches automatically upon meeting the 
eligibility requirements. 
• Reopeners: The only reopeners are new or additional releases 
knowingly caused and exacerbation of off-site migration. 
Connecticut 
In contrast to Iowa, Connecticut enacted legislation in 2005 that 
operates in remarkably narrow circumstances. 32 
• Eligibility: Connecticut has the most demanding eligibility 
requirements of any state. In addition to not having caused or 
contributed to the contamination, and completing a cleanup to the 
state's satisfaction, an owner of a contaminated site is eligible for 
relief only if he or she: (a) did not, in the state environmental 
department's opinion, create any conditions on the property that 
can reasonably be expected to create a source of pollution to state 
waters; and (b) is not responsible for crea ting any other pollution 
or source of pollution on the property, including not only the 
contamination in question but possibly pollution authorized by 
state permit. 
• Scope: Eligible parties are immune against liability to any private 
party for "any costs or damages" with respect to any pre-existing 
contamination. There is no immunity for new releases. Because the 
statute makes no explicit reference to civil as opposed to statutory 
costs or damages, it is unclear whether it limits civil liability. Even 
if it does, the eligibility conditions are so restrictive that the 
immunity likely applies only in circumstances where the risk of 
civil liability would be very low to begin with. 
• Conditions: The party must complete a cleanup to applicable 
regulatory standards and obtain state approval of both the site 
investigation report and a final cleanup report. 
• Timing: Immunity attaches only upon state approval of the final 
cleanup report. 
• Reopeners: Liability may be reopened for failure to comply with 
any land use restrictions applicable to the site, or for providing 
false or misleading information. The state always retains the power 
to step in and conduct its own cleanup. 
32 Act Concerning Third-Party Liability for Contaminated Property (2005), P.A. No. 05/90 
(S.B. No. 795), Conn. Gen. Stats. Ann.§ 22a-133ee. 
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California 
The final noteworthy state is California. In 2004 it enacted legislation 
protecting bona fide purchasers, innocent landowners, and contiguous 
property owners in designated urban in-fill areas against liability for 
response costs or other damages associated with a release. 33 
• Eligibility: Immunity is available to a bonafide purchaser, innocent 
landowner or contiguous landowner who did not cause or 
contribute to the release and is not potentially liable due to a 
personal or business relationship. Only sites that are in designated 
urban in-fill areas but not on federal or state Superfund priority 
lists are eligible. The party claiming immunity must prove that it 
made "all appropriate inquiries" about possible contamination 
before acquiring the site, has exercised statutorily-defined 
"appropriate care" with respect to the release of contaminants at 
the site, has co-operated with anyone authorized to conduct 
response actions at the site, has complied with any land use 
controls in connection with any approved cleanup at the site, has 
complied with all government requests for information regarding 
releases, and has satisfied all spill notification and reporting 
requirements. 
• Scope: The immunity covers liability "under any applicable 
statute" for response costs or "other damages" associated with a 
pre-existing release that has been identified in a cleanup plan and 
cleaned up to the state's satisfaction. There is no immunity for 
personal injury, death, permit violations or criminal acts, or for 
claims arising under contractual indemnity agreements between 
purchasers and sellers of real property. While the immunity only 
applies to liability under "any applicable statute'', the Act's 
drafters claim that the Act was intended to bar common law 
claims. Bills are currently pending in the California legislature to 
correct this error,34 but until they are enacted this provision must 
be classified as uncertain. Even if it applies to civil liability, 
however, the scope of "other damages" is unclear. 
• Conditions: The applicant must enter an oversight agreement with 
the state, get state approval of a site assessment plan and cleanup 
plan, clean up the contamination to regulatory standards, co-
operate with and provide site access to the state, obtain state 
33 California Land Reuse and Revitalization Act of 2004, CA Health and Safety Code, c. 
6.82, § 25395.81. 
34 2005 Cal. Assembly Bill No. 766, Cal. 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (amended/subbed June 21 , 2006); 
2005 Cal. Assembly Bill No. 2145, Cal. 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (introduced February 21, 2006); 
2005 Cal. Assembly Bill No. 597, Cal. 2005-06 Reg. Sess. (amended/subbed June 27, 2005). 
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approval of the completed cleanup and pay all state oversight 
costs. The state may require long-term institutional or engineering 
controls and financial assurances. 
• Timing: Immunity attaches upon execution of an oversight 
agreement with the state, before preparation of the site assessment 
plan. 
• Reopeners: Liability may be reopened for new releases caused by 
the claimant after completion of an approved cleanup, material 
deviation from the oversight agreement, unilateral termination of 
the agreement by either party, or fraud or misrepresentation. The 
state may order further cleanup in the event of change to a more 
sensitive land use. Previously undiscovered releases not caused by 
the party may be covered by the immunity if resolved to the state's 
satisfaction. Finally, the state always retains the power to step in 
and conduct its own cleanup. 
Other states 
In Alabama, non-polluting prospective purchasers who complete a 
cleanup to the state's satisfaction under the state voluntary cleanup 
program are immune against claims by the state or third parties for cleanup 
costs, "equitable relief', or "damages resultant from" pre-existing relea-
ses. 35 Liability is reopened for new releases, violations of the cleanup plan, 
or intentional, wanton or wilful violations of state or federal law during the 
cleanup process. Since there is no explicit reference to common law, it is 
uncertain whether this provision limits civil liability. 
Florida has several provisions that may limit civil liability in relation 
to contaminated land, two of which are relevant here. First, any person who 
did not cause or contribute to contamination at a designated brownfield site 
and who performs a brownfield cleanup agreement with the state and a 
brownfield redevelopment agreement with the local government, is relieved 
of further liability for remediation of the site, and of liability in contribution 
to anyone who incurs cleanup liability for the site. 36 It is unclear whether this 
immunity extends to civil liability. Second, innocent contiguous owners 
whose property is contaminated by migration from a nearby designated 
brownfield site are not subject to judicial action by any person to compel 
cleanup of, or pay the cost of cleaning up, sites contaminated by materials 
that migrated onto the property from the designa ted brownfield area. 37 This 
provision appears clearly to limit civil liability, although it is restricted to 
35 Alabama Land Recycling and Economic Redevelopment Act, Ala. Code§ 22-30E-9(a). 
36 Fla . Stat.§ 376.82(2)(a). 
37 Fla. Stat.§ 376.82(2)(k). 
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actions to compel cleanup or recover cleanup costs. Whereas the previous 
immunity is subject to numerous conditions and reopeners, this one requires 
no cleanup and has no express reopeners. 
Georgia has two relevant legislative provisions. First, bona fide 
purchasers and prospective purchasers who complete an approved volun-
tary cleanup are immune against third party claims for contribution or 
damages arising from a release of a substance which was the subject of the 
cleanup plan. 38 Second, prospective purchasers, and bona fide purchasers 
who purchased land between 2002 and 2005, who complete an approved 
voluntary cleanup are immune against liability to the state or third parties 
for costs incurred in the remediation of, equitable relief relating to, or 
damages resultant from any pre-existing release. 39 It is unclear whether 
these two provisions limit civil liability or how they relate to each other. 
In Missouri, a purchaser of an abandoned or underutilized property 
who completes a voluntary cleanup to the state's satisfaction as part of an 
eligible brownfields redevelopment project that generates defined public 
benefits, enjoys a rather vague immunity against civil liability for cleanup 
costs or other legal or equitable damages.40 Liability may be reopened for 
new releases, previously unknown conditions, conditions not addressed in 
the voluntary cleanup, violation of the brownfields redevelopment agree-
ment, failure to remediate the contamination. in accordance with the 
voluntary cleanup plan or legislation, or failure to operate the redeveloped 
facility in compliance with local, state and federal environmental laws. 
Finally, in Virginia, persons who acquire a property after it has 
already been cleaned up by someone else to the satisfaction of the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency are immune against "private civil suit" 
(an undefined term) related to contamination that was the subject of the 
satisfactory remediation.41 
Conclusion 
While several U.S. states have limited civil liability for brownfields 
redevelopers, a majority of U.S. jurisdictions have declined to do so. Any 
decisions about limiting civil liability in Canada should be the result of 
informed deliberation in which all relevant interests, including civil society 
groups, are adequately represented42 and in which all relevant issues are 
considered. One issue that has been ignored almost entirely in the U.S. is 
how to protect the interests of the third parties whose rights and remedies 
38 Georgia Hazardous Site Response Act, Ga. Code Ann.,§ 12-8-96.3(c). 
39 Georgia Hazardous Site Reuse and Redevelopment Act, Ga. Code Ann.,§ I 2-8-207(a). 
40 Missouri Abandoned Property Redevelopment Projects Law, Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 447.714. 
41 Virginia Brownfield Restoration and Land Renewal Act, Va. Code§ 10.1-1235. 
42 The composition of both the New Brunswick and Ontario consultative groups mentioned 
earlier is cause for concern on this basis. See, supra, footnotes 3 and 4 and accompanying 
text. 
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are limited. None of the statutes identified above makes any provision for 
redressing the harm suffered by the innocent third parties whose claims are 
barred. It is possible that legislators simply did not turn their minds to this 
issue, or decided that third parties merited no protection.43 Happily, 
proponents of civil liability relief in Canada do not appear to suggest that 
innocent third parties be left out in the cold. But a great deal more attention 
still needs to be paid to how third parties' rights would be protected. 
Another critical set of questions is what, precisely, are the civil liability 
scenarios that pose the greatest obstacles to brownfields redevelopment and 
how serious is the risk of such liability, in terms of both magnitude and 
probability. Any legislative action on civil liability must be informed by a 
clear, common understanding of what the liability risks actually are, and 
what the difference is, if any, between actual and perceived risk. Work 
towards such an understanding is under way, but there is still ground to 
cover. 
Next, it is irriportant to recognize that civil liability has been a 
secondary concern in American liability relief initiatives. The primary 
objective in most cases has been to ease regulatory liability and prevent 
aggrieved parties from using common law to circumvent the statutory 
scheme. Civil liability relief is, in most cases, quite narrow in terms of the 
scope of liabilities limited, the parties eligible, or the conditions they must 
meet to acquire and retain immunity. Most of the immunity provisions 
described above do very little to alter the status quo. They apply in 
circumstances where civil liability risk is low, or they reduce liability only 
marginally to give "an extra push to help turn around the sites that the 
market comes close to turning around on its own" .44 This does not mean 
that they serve no purpose. Even if they make little difference to civil liability 
rules, they may still be valuable insofar as they enhance certainty about 
liability risk. 
Many of the U.S. liability relief statutes are vague, ambiguous, 
unnecessarily convoluted and remarkably poorly drafted. Many key terms 
are undefined and poorly understood, making it difficult to tell in a few cases 
whether the legislation was intended to limit' civil liability and, in many 
cases, what kinds of civil liabilities are limited, in what circumstances. This is 
due in part to differences in legislative processes between Canada and the 
U.S., but it underlines the importance of careful and clear legislative 
drafting. 
More importantly, these civil liability relief provisions have not 
attracted the attention of brownfields lawyers and have had little impact on 
brownfields revitalization despite the fact that some of them have been in 
4 3 See, e.g., Fla. Stat.§ 376.3078(1)(1) (declaring that third party rights barred by the statute 
are "speculative" and that liability relief is "intended to prevent judicial interpretations 
allowing windfall awards that thwart the public interest"). 
44 Massachusetts Brownfields regulations, 940 CMR 23.01. 
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force since the mid-l 990s. A clearer picture of why this is so would be very 
useful to Canadians grappling with these issues, but little or no information 
appears to be available on this issue. 
Finally, we should not assume that any American legislation or 
experiences can simply be transplanted into Canadian legal soil. Civil 
liability regimes vary both within and between Canada and the U.S. Civil 
liability risk is influenced significantly by the regulatory environment, 
including the nature and degree of regulatory cleanup liability and 
governments' enforcement cultures. There are substantial differences both 
between the United States and Canada, and within Canada, on these points. 
We should think carefully about these differences before drawing any 
conclusions about the applicability of American legal initiatives here. 
